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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of bridging and bonding social
capital on two important measures of individual success: earnings and subjectively
reported well-being (SWB). As our first step, we shall do this by the means of an
analysis of a simplified dynamic model of social capital formation which offers em-
pirically testable predictions. The second step consists in bringing this model to our
data set which covers a cross-section of the Polish society in 2005.
Our approach to social capital bases upon its network operationalization, origi-
nating from, among others, Bourdieu (1986). More precisely, we define social capital
along the lines of Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 119): “Social capital is the sum
of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition”, or alternatively, Lin (2001, p. 24): “resources em-
bedded in social networks and accessed and used by actors for actions”.1 The second
definition indicates that our approach agrees also with the Coleman’s postulate that
social capital is inevitably related to action: “social capital is created when the rela-
tions among persons change the way that facilitate action” (Coleman, 1990, p. 304).
For this reason, we expect social capital to be linked with earnings and subjective
well-being.
The notions of bridging and bonding social capital have been first introduced to
social sciences by Putnam (2000). They refer to forming social ties with people in
a different (in the case of bridging social capital) or similar (bonding social capital)
socio-economic position. These two concepts are considered to illustrate specific types
of social capital. Putnam defines bridging and bonding social capital as follows: “Of
all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the most im-
portant is the distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive).
Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to
reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. Other networks are outward
looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam, 2000. p. 22).
“To build bridging social capital requires that we transcend our social and political
and professional identities to connect with people unlike ourselves” (Putnam 2000, p.
411).
There are substantial differences between forming social ties with family members
(bonding social capital), and with friends and acquaintances (bridging social capital).
Wellman (1990) describes these differences in the following way: “unlike the support
of friends, the availability of support from immediate kin is not conditional on the
strength of the relationship” (Wellman, 1990). Manuel Castelles goes much further
and argues: “friends are for [expressive] pleasure; relatives are for [instrumental]
1In our empirical work, we shall focus on the number of particular people (either family members
or friends) with whom the respondent maintains frequent contacts as our proxy variable for the above
mentioned: “durable networks of (...) relationships”. See Section 4.
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business.” On the other hand, “the combination of kith and kin supplies both stable
support from ascribed ties with immediate kin and adaptive support from achieved
ties with friends, neighbors and co-workers and other organizational ties.” (Wellman,
1990).
A variety of theoretical investigations show that bridging social capital, contrary to
bonding social capital, has multiple beneficial outcomes for social order, democracy,
and wealth. It goes together with civil liberties and the tolerance for gender and
racial equality. It strengthens the functioning of democracy by reducing corruption
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, “[b]onding
social capital (as distinct from bridging social capital) is particularly likely to have
illiberal effects” (Putnam, 2000, p. 358). More precisely, “[b]onding social capital has
negative effects for society as a whole, but may have positive effects for the members
belonging to this closed social group or network. Bridging social capital, (...) [which
consists in] making contacts between different groups or networks is positive. At
the micro level this is related to Burt’s theory of structural holes, where the optimal
position for an individual is between several groups” (Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003,
p. 5). Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003) proceed to show that, across European
regions, bridging social capital is empirically good for economic growth, whereas
bonding social capital is bad for growth. These authors also find that corruption is
negatively correlated with the measures of bridging social capital (Beugelsdijk and
Smulders, 2003).
Bridging social capital is also claimed to be individually beneficial for those who
possess it. Hurlbert, Haines and Beggs’ (2000) research on the structure and content
of one’s social network and its activation in the context of seeking social support in
a non-routine situation (hurricane Andrew) shows that networks with more gender,
race, and age diversity provide more support than networks lacking these charac-
teristics. Granovetter’s (1973) most prominent discovery is that weak ties (i.e. ties
between dissimilar people) facilitate better job attainment than strong ties (between
similar people).2 Erickson’s (1996, 2003, 2004) research on the diversification of
acquaintances shows that “people with more diversified general networks were less
depressed and were better informed about health” (Erickson, 2003). Moreover, Er-
ickson argues that the sense of control over one’s life increases with the diversity of
one’s acquaintances.
Given this background, we organize our thinking around the following two key
expectations: (i) bridging social capital should be unambiguously beneficial for indi-
viduals’ earnings and subjective well-being, (ii) the impact of bonding social capital
should be much less pronounced and possibly negative.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. First, it adds to the
theoretical debate on the character and economic meaning of social capital, empha-
sizing the importance of the distinction between bridging and bonding social capital,
and offering a formal model which explains the dynamics of social capital forma-
2However, some works are incongruent with this statement (e.g. Bian, 1997).
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tion. Second, by deriving testable relationships from an explicitly specified economic
model, it provides a key for understanding the variety of regression specifications
found across the empirical literature. Third, it helps draw direct conclusions about
the socio-economic situation in today’s Poland, marked by extremely low levels of
bridging social capital and social trust, and with individual earnings of Poles rising
much faster than their confidence in democracy (Doman´ski, 2005). We find that in
a society like the one in Poland, everyone could benefit from an increase in bridging
social capital.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we put forward a
simplified dynamic model of social capital formation where not only consumption but
also subjective well-being matters for individuals’ utility. In Section 3, we generalize
this model and derive the main predictions about the impact of bonding and bridging
social capital on earnings and SWB. In Section 4, we summarize our micro-level cross-
section data. In Section 5, we present the empirical results that confirm the main
predictions of our model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The dynamics of social capital formation
We shall now discuss a simplified model which elucidates the dynamics of social capital
formation.
2.1 Setup of the model
Let us consider an individual who wants to maximize her lifelong sum of subjec-
tive well-being (SWB). Following Helliwell (2003) as well as O’Brien and Quimby
(2006), we shall presuppose that SWB is composed of (i) consumption, (ii) satisfac-
tion from family life, (iii) satisfaction from social life outside the family, and (iv)
other characteristics such as the evaluation of one’s health, and general conditions
and circumstances of life.3 The last component (iv) we consider exogenous to the
model (though in reality, it will be correlated with earnings) and set aside hereafter.
Please note that we take a markedly broader view of the maximized objective function
to what is customary in economics – in the discussed framework, individuals derive
utility also from other variables than just consumption. Mathematically, this means
that the instantaneous flow of well-being is given by
SWB = Hc`ψf v
θ, (1)
where H is the constant exogenous constituent factor of SWB, c is consumption, `f
denotes the fraction of time spent with the family, and v denotes the stock of bridging
social capital. ψ > 0 and θ > 0 are elasticity parameters of bonding and bridging
3By general conditions and circumstances of life, we mean housing conditions, congestion in the
place of residence, frequency of problems with neighbors, etc.
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social capital, respectively. In (1) we have used the Cobb-Douglas specification for
analytical simplicity rather than any other reason.4
To keep things as simple as possible, we assume away the possibility of savings
and capital accumulation. Thus, all earnings w are always immediately spent on
consumption, and nothing is ever stored. The production function is linear in labor
(which is the only production factor here), and further augmented by a positive
spillover from bridging social capital. We write:
w = c = A`Y v
φ, (2)
with
`Y = 1 − `f − `v, (3)
and A being the constant “total factor productivity”, `Y being the fraction of the
total time endowment spent effectively at work, `v being the fraction of time spent
on socializing with people outside of the family, and the parameter φ > 0 being the
strength of the spillover from bridging social capital to production. This spillover
is included here since it is argued (e.g. Dasgupta, 2002; Whiteley, 2000) that social
capital – and in particular bridging social capital (Granovetter, 1973) – facilitates
the matching of workers and firms, speeds up information transmission, and reduces
transaction costs and deadweight losses in economic activity. Please note that this
spillover is fully internalized by the decision-making individuals: they treat social
ties with friends and acquaintances both as ends (direct increase in SWB, with an
elasticity θ) and (instrumentally) as means for raising the level of consumption (with
an elasticity φ).5 The total time endowment at each instant in time is normalized to
unity.
Bridging social capital v is modeled as a stock and not as a flow as in Beugelsdijk
and Smulders (2003). Intuitively, it is clear that bridging social capital might be
accumulated through purposeful investments of time – i.e. time spent socializing with
4Alternatively, one could use a CES or a nested CES formulation of the well-being/utility function
without modifying the main conclusions to be derived. See Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003).
5Let us discuss the alternatives to the production function we assumed in equation (2). One
may doubt whether the spillover from bridging social capital to production is fully internalized by
individuals. Thus, one could replace (2) with w = A`Y v¯φ, where v¯ is the average level of bridging
social capital in the economy and is considered external to the individuals’ decisions. Furthermore,
one could doubt whether there exists a true spillover from bridging social capital to productivity:
one could expect its appearance to be an artifact of the so-called “fallacy of composition” (see the
discussion in Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004): bridging social capital may improve the earnings of
some individuals only at the expense of others without having an impact on aggregate productivity.
In such case, we would write w = A`Y (v/v¯)φ and thus w = A`Y in the symmetric equilibrium. A
final possibility is a generalization of our previous ideas, a function w = A`Y vφv¯ν that includes both
internal and external effects of bridging social capital on productivity. Quantitatively, the outcomes
of the model will clearly differ depending on which production function we choose. Qualitatively,
however, as we shall see in Section 5, these differences do not overturn the main predictions and
characteristics of the model, presented hereafter in a series of propositions.
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friends and acquaintances – and that it depreciates gradually, not instantaneously,
over time if not enough effort is made to maintain the social ties. Consequently, we
write
v˙ = `µv − δvv, (4)
with µ > 0 as the returns-to-scale parameter in bridging social capital accumulation
and δv > 0 as the depreciation rate of bridging social capital (the rate of natural
decay of social ties).
Bonding social capital which is an asset deriving from ascribed ties with the family
should be, in principle, modeled along the same lines as bridging social capital. We
would like to tentatively suppress this fact here and identify bonding social capital f
with the fraction of time spent on socializing with the family, `f . This has the strongly
counterfactual implication that ties with family depreciate instantaneously, i.e. bond-
ing social capital becomes immediately zero at the time when no investment in it is
made. We make this counterfactual assumption here in order to gain a substantial
degree of precision in the description of the dynamics of formation of bridging social
capital: thanks to this, we can draw a phase diagram in a two-dimensional space and
obtain clear-cut results on the transition. In the analysis from Section 3 onwards we
shall dispose of this strong assumption and treat bonding and bridging social capital
in a more symmetric manner.
We assume a constant discount rate ρ > 0 and a logarithmic utility function.
Thus, using (1) and (2), we write the individual’s maximization problem as:
max
{`f (t),`v(t)}+∞t=0
∫ +∞
0
ln[HA(1 − `f − `v)vφ`ψf vθ]e−ρtdt s.t. v˙ = `µv − δvv. (5)
2.2 The dynamic equations
It can be easily shown that the optimal time investment in maintaining the ties with
family, given by `f , always moves against `v:
`f =
ψ
1 + ψ
(1 − `v) (6)
at all times t.
After necessary algebraic manipulations, we obtain the dynamic equation for `v,
i.e. the evolution of optimal time investment in bridging social capital over time. It
reads:
˙`
v = `v
(
ρ+ δv − θ+φ1+ψ
(
1−`v
v
)
µ`µ−1v
1 − µ+ `v
1−`v
)
. (7)
Let us now proceed to the description of the steady state of the model and its
dynamics.
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2.3 Steady state
The model meets the usual concavity requirements for an interior maximum easily,
and it possesses a unique interior steady state such that v˙ = 0. From (7) it is obtained
that the fractions of time spent on socializing with family and friends in the steady
state, and the steady-state level of bridging social capital are equal, respectively, to:
`∗f =
ψ
1 + ψ
(
ρ+ δv
(θ + φ)µδv + ρ+ δv
)
, (8)
`∗v =
(θ + φ)µδv
(θ + φ)µδv + ρ+ δv
, (9)
v∗ =
1
δv
(
(θ + φ)µδv
(θ + φ)µδv + ρ+ δv
)µ
. (10)
2.4 Dynamics
The steady state described above is unique and saddle-path stable, and offers a unique
transition path (stable arm) assuring convergence to it.6 It is easily proven that the
v˙ = 0 curve is upward-sloping in the (v, `v) space while the ˙`v = 0 curve is downward-
sloping. Moreover, v˙ = 0 starts at `v = 0 for v = 0 and then grows to infinity, while
˙`
v = 0 starts at `v = 1 for v = 0 and then falls down asymptotically to zero. The
phase diagram is presented in Figure 1.7
It should be emphasized that the slope of the saddle path is unambiguously neg-
ative. An individual who starts off with a low level of social capital (has only few
acquaintances) will initially invest more in social capital creation than she will do in
the long run. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Over the transition, the fraction of time spent on socializing with
friends outside of the family `v decreases over time t > 0 if v(0) < v
∗ and increases
over time if v(0) > v∗.
Proposition 1 has one strong implication for the empirical analysis of cross-section
data. Namely, while the long-run relationship between social capital investment `v
and the social capital stock v is clearly positive (since in the steady state, δvv = `
µ
v ),
the short-run relationship outside of the steady state is negative: individuals with low
levels of social capital v will tend to invest more in its accumulation than individuals
who have it in abundance. Thus, when regressing v on `v one ought to control for the
age of an individual to capture the long-run relationship and not just the transition.
6The path converging to the steady state and satisfying the first-order condition (7) is automati-
cally chosen since it is the only one that does not have utility diverging to minus infinity (as v → 0)
and satisfies the transversality condition λv → 0, with λ = e−ρt/(`Y µ`µ−1v ) being the shadow price
of bridging social capital.
7The parameter values used to produce Figure 1: ψ = 1, θ = 2, ρ = .05, φ = .2, δv = .04, µ = .3.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram in the (v, `v) space.
3 Bridging vs bonding social capital: model pre-
dictions
3.1 Generalized model
Let us now add more realism to the simple model from Section 2. The differences
are that now (i) we shall model bonding social capital along the lines of bridging
social capital, like a state variable, (ii) we shall slightly generalize the accumulation
functions for both kinds of social capital.
Similarily to (4) we assume now that bonding social capital is increased by pur-
poseful investments of time – i.e. time spent on socializing with family. This type of
social capital is now also subject to gradual depreciation. We assume that it decays
at a constant rate δf > 0.
8
8Intuitively, one could expect ties with family to decay slower than the “weak” ties with strangers
(cf. Granovetter, 1973), i.e. δf < δv. The relative magnitude of the two decay rates is not important
for our analysis.
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The modified bridging social capital equation (4) and its counterpart for bonding
social capital read:
v˙ = `µvv
τ − δvv, (11)
f˙ = `αf f
β − δff, (12)
with µ, τ, α, β ∈ (0, 1).
The indivual’s objective is now to maximize the discounted sum of utilities, ac-
crued from the instantaneous levels of subjective well-being, i.e.
SWB = Hcfψvθ, (13)
subject to (11)–(12). The first order conditions of optimality for this problem boil
down to two dynamic equations in `f and `v. Thus, we obtain a four-dimensional
dynamical system in the (`f , `v, f, v) space. We cannot draw a phase diagram any
more, but it can still be shown that the system possesses a unique interior steady state
which is saddle-path stable. Furthermore, the time investments in the two types of
social capital, `f and `v respectively, both decline over time along the transition path
if the initial levels of social capital are below their respective steady-state levels.9 Let
us now focus on the properties of the steady state itself.
3.2 Steady state
The steady state is found by finding values of `∗f , `
∗
v, f
∗, v∗ which ensure ˙`f = ˙`v =
f˙ = v˙ = 0. From (11)–(12), it is easily obtained that the steady state must satisfy
f ∗ =
[
(`∗f )
α
δf
] 1
1−β
, (14)
v∗ =
[
(`∗v)
µ
δv
] 1
1−τ
. (15)
The implication for cross-section regressions is that the steady-state relationship be-
tween levels of social capital and investments in it is unambiguously positive.
Using the auxilliary notation:
Φ =
ρ+ (1 − β)δf
ψαδf
, (16)
Ξ =
(
ρ+ (1 − β)δf
ρ+ (1 − τ)δv
)(
(θ + φ)µδv
ψαδf
)
, (17)
9These results are available from the authors upon request.
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we find that in the steady state, `Y /`f = Φ and `v/`f = Ξ, or equivalently,
`∗f =
1
1 + Φ + Ξ
, (18)
`∗v =
Ξ
1 + Φ + Ξ
, (19)
`∗Y =
Φ
1 + Φ + Ξ
. (20)
The comparative statics for these three time allocations have been computed an-
alytically and are summarized in Table 1 below (“+” denotes positive influence, “–”
denotes negative influence, “?” denotes ambiguous sign).
Variable ρ ψ θ φ α β µ τ δf δv
`∗f ?
a + – – + + – – + –
`∗v ?
a – + + – – + + – +
`∗Y ?
b – – – – – – – – –
Table 1: Comparative statics of the steady state.
athe derivative is a sum of two expressions, one of them unambiguously negative and
the second – ambiguously signed. An increase in ρ implies an increase in Ξ = `∗v/`
∗
f iff
(1 − τ)δv > (1 − β)δf , i.e. the effective depreciation rate is higher for bridging social
capital.
bthe case with ∂`∗Y /∂ρ < 0 is very special and can only be obtained if bridging social
capital is exceptionally productive. Then we also have unambiguously ∂`∗v/∂ρ > 0.
Under all plausible parameter assumptions, though, the discount rate is positively
related to hours worked since all production is immediately consumed and social
capital creation requires time.
The interpretation of these comparative statics is straightforward. The parameter
ψ captures the share of family life in individuals’ SWB. Thus, its increase will raise
the individual’s time investment in family life at the expense of all other activities.
The parameters θ and φ capture the share of social life outside of the family in the
individuals’ SWB (θ is the direct share while φ captures the indirect effect through
increased earnings). Thus, their increases will make one spend more time on her social
life, again at the expense of all other activities. α, β and δf relate to the efficiency
of accumulation of bonding social capital. Their increase will raise the time share
of family life at the expense of other activities because either (i) a greater return
on investment in bonding social capital is expected (if α or β rises), or (ii) more
replacement investment is necessary to maintain the current level of bonding social
capital (if δf rises). Symetrically, the same arguments apply to µ, τ and δv that build
the case of bridging social capital.
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3.3 Implications for earnings and SWB
Let us now concentrate on the steady-state values of earnings and SWB. They satisfy
the following relationships:
w∗ = A`∗Y (v
∗)φ = A`∗Y
[
(`∗v)
µ
δv
] φ
1−τ
, (21)
SWB∗ = HA`∗Y (f
∗)ψ(v∗)θ+φ = HA`∗Y
[
(`∗f )
α
δf
] ψ
1−β [(`∗v)µ
δv
] θ+φ
1−τ
, (22)
where the optimal steady-state time allocations `∗f , `
∗
v and `
∗
Y should be taken from
(18), (19) and (20), respectively.
Proposition 2 The relationship between the amount of time invested in the forma-
tion of bonding social capital (`f) and earnings is unambiguously negative.
This is by no means a surprising result: by assumption, bonding social capital has
no direct effect on productivity while accumulating it diverts the otherwise productive
time towards socializing with the family.
Proposition 3 The relationship between the amount of time invested in the forma-
tion of bonding social capital (`f) and SWB is inverse U-shaped. In the steady state,
individuals allocate less time than is required to maximize instantaneous SWB.
The inverse U-shaped relationship between `f and SWB derives from the two
offseting forces: (i) the direct positive impact of family life on SWB, (ii) the indi-
rect negative effect through lowered earnings. There exists a unique maximum of
instantaneous SWB, for it to be obtained it must hold that
`f
`Y
=
ψα
1 − β . (23)
However, in the steady state we have
`∗f
`∗Y
=
ψαδf
ρ+ (1 − β)δf <
ψα
1 − β . (24)
The difference between the two formulas – the “underinvestment in bonding social
capital” result – stems from the fact that in the dynamic setup, one has to counter-
act social capital decay by replacement investment. Furthermore, work effort gives
instantaneous payoffs while social capital needs to be accumulated in the first place.
This works like a delay which is naturally disliked by the impatient individuals.
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Proposition 4 The relationship between the amount of time invested in the forma-
tion of bridging social capital (`v) and earnings is inverse U-shaped. In the steady
state, individuals allocate less time to bridging social capital formation than is required
to maximize instantaneous earnings if and only if
θ <
φρ
(1 − τ)δv (25)
(the share of bridging social capital in SWB is low enough). They allocate more
time than is required to maximize instantaneous earnings if the inequality in (25) is
reversed (i.e. when bridging social capital is a sizeable part of SWB).
Since bridging social capital is assumed to have a positive spillover effect on pro-
ductivity, while still diverting working time towards socializing with others, its rela-
tion to earnings is also inverse U-shaped. Maximum earnings are obtained when
`v
`Y
=
φµ
1 − τ , (26)
while in the steady state we have
`∗v
`∗Y
=
(θ + φ)µδv
ρ+ (1 − τ)δv . (27)
There are two effects at work here: (i) individuals maximize SWB not earnings.
Thus, they attach an elasticity of θ+φ to bridging social capital, not just φ; (ii) in the
dynamic setup, one has to counteract social capital decay by replacement investment.
The first effect increases the investment in bridging social capital while the second
one decreases it. What matters for the final outcome is the balance between these
two effects. If θ is high enough, then the first effect is stronger and thus the net effect
is positive; if θ is low, then the second effect prevails and we have “underinvestment”
in bridging social capital. If θ(1− τ)δv = φρ then the two effect exactly level off and
in the steady state, earnings are maximized.
It is important to note that if (25) holds, one should expect a positive cross-section
relation between earnings and bridging social capital. If it is violated, the expected
cross-section relation is negative. This is depicted in Figure 2 below.10
Proposition 5 The relationship between the amount of time invested in the forma-
tion of bridging social capital (`v) and SWB is inverse U-shaped. In the steady state,
individuals allocate less time than is required to maximize instantaneous SWB.
Just like in Proposition 3, the inverse U-shaped relationship between `v and SWB
derives from the two offseting forces: (i) the direct positive impact of social life outside
of the family on SWB, (ii) the indirect negative effect through lowered earnings. The
further reasoning follows the one in Proposition 3 directly, so we need not reproduce
it here.
10The parameter values used to produce Figure 2: φ = .6, δv = .04, µ = .3, τ = .2, A = 1.
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Figure 2: The inverse U-shaped relationship between bridging social capital and
earnings.
3.4 Numerical example
For the sake of a numerical example, let us now assign specific values to the key
parameters of the model to understand its workings better. We shall propose three
baseline “scenarios” here: (i) one of a sociable individual who cares about her social
capital (both bridging and bonding) a lot, (ii) one of a family-oriented individual
whose share of family life satisfaction (bonding social capital) is especially high, and
(iii) one of a materialistic individual who cares primarily about her consumption. We
shall assume that the decay rate of social ties is higher for bridging social capital than
for bonding social capital (δv > δf ). Furthermore, we normalize the exogenous factor
of SWB H and total factor productivity A to unity for all individuals.
The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
In the summary Table 3 we report the following steady-state results: the share
of time spent socializing with family (`∗f ), with friends and acquaintances (`
∗
v), and
the share of time spent at work (`∗Y ). We compare them with the time shares that
maximize instantaneous SWB or instantaneous earnings. We also report the steady-
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Scenario ρ ψ θ φ α β µ τ δf δv
sociable 0.05 2 2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.02 0.04
family 0.05 4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.02 0.04
materialistic 0.05 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.02 0.04
Table 2: Parameter values: three scenarios.
state values of bonding and bridging social capital (f ∗ and v∗, respectively) together
with the resultant levels of earnings. We do not report levels of SWB because they
are not comparable across individuals with different elasticity parameters ψ and θ.
Scenario `∗f `
∗
v `
∗
Y `
SWB
f `
SWB
v `
SWB
Y `
w
f `
w
v `
w
Y
sociable .116 .244 .640 .275 .358 .367 0 .184 .816
family .243 .088 .669 .529 .119 .352 0 .184 .816
materialistic .039 .112 .845 .123 .221 .656 0 .184 .816
Scenario f ∗ v∗ w∗ wmax{w} wmax{SWB}
sociable 59.35 32.92 5.21 6.23 3.26
family 78.24 22.48 4.33 6.23 2.44
materialistic 39.24 24.59 5.80 6.23 5.22
Table 3: The steady state under three scenarios.
Please note the following interesting findings deriving from this numerical example:
1. In the “sociable” scenario the individual spends more time socializing with
friends and acquaintances than is necessary to maximize instantaneous earnings.
The gap between the maximum attainable wage and the one which is chosen in
the steady state is 1.02 and the individual could close it only by lowering her
bridging social capital. In such case, one would expect a negative relationship
between bridging social capital (which is present in relative abundance) and
earnings.
2. In two other scenarios the individual spends less time socializing with friends
outside of the family than is necessary to maximize instantaneous earnings. This
means that the spillover effects from bridging social capital to productivity are
not fully utilized. The individuals could increase their earnings by increasing
the fraction of time spent on accumulating bridging social capital, even if their
working time would shrink by the respective quantity. In such case, one would
expect a positive relationship between bridging social capital (whose stock is
insufficient) and earnings.
3. Under all scenarios, the earnings obtained in the steady state are greater than
the earnings one gets when maximizing instantaneous SWB. This is due to the
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impatience of the individuals (ρ > 0) and the fact that social capital needs
to be accumulated first before it could count as a steady fraction of SWB.
In our model, all production is immediately consumed, while social capital
accumulation requires time.
4 Survey data
Our data set is a cross section of individual respondents, a representative sample of the
Polish society surveyed in 2005 within the “Social Diagnosis” (“Diagnoza spo leczna”)
program.11 The entirety of the data set offers information on a wide variety of social
dimensions; we select only those variables which are relevant to our hypotheses.
As far as the empirical analysis is concerned, our objective is to use the data to
test the predictions of our theoretical model regarding the dependence of individuals’
earnings as well as their SWB on measures of bridging and bonding social capital. We
also have to control for a number of variables that have been shown in the literature to
influence earnings and SWB but which have been neglected in the theoretical model
for simplicity.
Unfortunately, there are no direct measures of bridging and bonding social capital
in the data. We have to rely on imprecise proxy variables here. Given these lim-
itations, we proxy bridging social capital by the number of friends with whom the
respondent maintains frequent contacts; and bonding social capital – by the number
of family members with whom the respondent maintains frequent contacts.12
One characteristic feature of our data set is that in Poland, the level of bridging
social capital is, in principle, extremely low. Indeed, international comparative re-
search (Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen, 2006) shows that in post-communist countries such
as Poland, bridging social capital is lower than in any other welfare state regime. It
is the highest in the “Nordic” welfare state regime (represented by Denmark, Fin-
land, and Norway), followed by the “liberal” regime (with Australia, Canada, Great
Britain, New Zealand, and United States), and the “conservative” regime (with Aus-
tria, France, former West Germany, and Switzerland). Then comes the “Mediter-
ranean” welfare state regime with Cyprus, Italy, and Spain, and the very last regime
is the “post-communist” one, with Czech Republic, former East Germany, Hungary,
Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia.13 Even more precisely, Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehto-
11“Social Diagnosis” is a panel project. Four consecutive waves of surveys have been carried out
until today: in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2007. In our analysis we use data from the 2005 wave because
it is the only wave which includes good enough proxy variables for bridging and bonding social
capital.
12In the survey, the respondents were also asked to name the number of acquaintances with whom
they frequently contact, but this variable turned out to be unrelated to both earnings and SWB,
and only weakly related to other measures of social capital. This could be, for example, because
people tend to define acquaintances in divergent ways.
13The proxy for bridging social capital here was participation in a political party, club or associa-
tion, trade union, religious association, sports group, hobby or leisure club, charitable organization,
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nen argue that the group of post-communist welfare state regime countries is not
completely homogeneous with respect to the levels of bridging social capital: the re-
sult for Poland is miserable enough to locate this country among the worst performing
even in this group, far below Czech Republic or Slovenia. As we shall see shortly, our
results will be influenced by the very low average level of bridging social capital in
our data. The Polish society is situated in the increasing part of the inverse U-shaped
curve shown in Figure 2, indicating that the relative share of social life (with friends
and acquaintances) in the average Pole’s SWB is very low (cf. Proposition 4).
As far as our measure of earnings is concerned, the best variable available in our
data is earnings per person in the household. This can be easily transformed into
total earnings in the household, or equivalent income, using the size of the household.
Unfortunately, we do not have any data on differences in individual earnings within
households.
Subjective well-being cannot be measured directly. It is constructed as a 24-item
scale here, where each item is a question related to a specific dimension of individual
well-being as perceived by the respondent.14 All variables are normalized such that
0 denotes the lowest level of satisfaction of a certain need, and 1 denotes its full
satisfaction (some questions have been inverted). As it is visible in Table 4, the
resultant scale is highly reliable (the standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient equals
0,851); as it further follows from Table 5, this level of reliability cannot be improved
any further by deleting items.
Cronbach’s α Std. Cronbach’s α No. of Items
0,829 0,851 24
Table 4: Reliability analysis for the scale of SWB. Basic reliability statistics.
In order to obtain consistent estimates for our model parameters, we shall employ
the following control variables neglected in the theoretical model. In the equation
explaining (the logarithm of) earnings, we control for education (years of schooling),
work experience at current workplace, work experience squared (cf. Mincer, 1974;
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2003) as well as the size of the town of residence in
which the individual lives, the individual’s age, and a dummy variable for “house-
wives” (i.e. people taking care of the household and not working outside of home).
neighborhood group, or “other”.
14The variables used in the scale are the following. dp3: valuation of one’s life; dp17: certainty
of the source of income; dp18: financial problems; dp19: strenuous job; dp20: too many duties;
dp22: congestion in the place of residence; dp24: problems with neighbors; dp38: material standard
of life; dp39: feeling happy; dp41: feeling depressed and thinking of suicide; dp42: feeling loved;
dp45: the strength of will to live; dp49n: valuation of one’s physical appearance; dp49o: mobi-
lization to work; dp49p: insomnia; dp49q: ease of getting tired; dp49r: appetite; dp49t: health
problems / hypochondria; dp49u: desire for sex; dp61 1: satisfaction from relations with the closest
family; dp61 9: satisfaction from housing conditions; dp61 13: satisfaction from sexual life; dp61 18:
satisfaction from children; dp61 19: satisfaction from marriage.
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Variablea Mean if del. Variance if del. Item–total corr. Cronbach’s α if del.
dp3 17,0640 5,710 0,478 0,821
dp17 17,1854 5,298 0,415 0,823
dp18 17,2977 5,224 0,501 0,817
dp19 17,1816 5,387 0,373 0,825
dp20 17,1414 5,475 0,344 0,826
dp22 16,9363 5,622 0,270 0,829
dp24 16,9740 5,648 0,258 0,829
dp38 17,2014 5,555 0,513 0,818
dp39 17,1447 5,592 0,546 0,818
dp41 16,8198 5,822 0,347 0,825
dp42 16,8419 5,602 0,351 0,824
dp45 17,6341 5,922 0,406 0,826
dp49n 16,9486 5,476 0,397 0,822
dp49o 16,8691 5,667 0,464 0,821
dp49p 16,9517 5,596 0,381 0,823
dp49q 16,9990 5,592 0,481 0,819
dp49r 16,8595 5,740 0,359 0,824
dp49t 16,9377 5,623 0,366 0,823
dp49u 16,9598 5,559 0,386 0,823
dp61 1 16,9694 5,751 0,397 0,823
dp61 9 17,0697 5,699 0,345 0,824
dp61 13 17,0403 5,664 0,434 0,821
dp61 18 16,9117 5,850 0,296 0,826
dp61 19 16,9471 5,697 0,423 0,822
a: for the definitions of variables, see Footnote 14.
Table 5: Reliability analysis for the scale of SWB. Item–total statistics.
The sex dummy turns out to be irrelevant (probably because the dependent variable
is earnings per person in the household).
In the equation explaining SWB, we again control for the individual’s age, the
size of town of residence, and the dummy for “housewives”. However, this time we
must also take care of the sex dummy and several indices of health and life conditions
or circumstances: suffering from a serious sickness, household size, and earnings (an
endogenous variable, explained within the same model).
5 Results
Let us now proceed to the presentation of our main regression results. The key
relations of the model are obtained by linearizing (21) and (22). Applying logarithms
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to both sides of these equations yields
lnw = lnA− φ
1 − τ ln δv + ln(`Y ) +
µφ
1 − τ ln(`v), (28)
lnSWB = lnH + lnA+ ln(`Y ) − ψ
1 − β ln δf −
θ + φ
1 − τ ln δv +
+
αψ
1 − β ln(`f ) +
µ(θ + φ)
1 − τ ln(`v). (29)
Please note that the decay rates of social ties (δf and δv) are equal for all individ-
uals and thus their terms in the above equations simply add to the intercept term.
Secondly, the implied regression equations are formulated in logs and not in levels.
Thirdly, we have to account for a number of control variables, purged into H and A
in (28)–(29) but highly relevant for explaining earnings and SWB.
5.1 Explaining earnings
As can be seen in Table 6, the steady-state elasticity of bridging social capital (proxied
by the number of frequently contacted friends) in determining earnings, is positive
and statistically significant at the 10% significance level (p-value = 0,0541). A 1%
increase in bridging social capital ought to increase one’s earnings by approximately
0,041%. This means that people in Poland tend to underinvest in bridging social
capital and that the Polish society is located in the increasing part of the inverse U-
shaped curve shown in Figure 2.15 Also in line with the predictions of the theoretical
model, the estimated elasticity of bonding social capital (proxied by the number of
frequently contacted family members) is negative. It is not significantly different from
zero, though.
All these results have been obtained controlling for a number of variables, whose
regression coefficients accord with the expected values, confirming the validity of
results obtained herein. Inhabitants of greater cities and agglomerations earn more
than those living in smaller towns or in the countryside; an additional year of schooling
brings about around a 6,1% increase in private earnings (cf. Heckman, Lochner, and
Todd, 2003); an additional year of experience at the current workplace increases
earnings by around 0,3%;16 older people earn more on average (even controlling for
experience).
The more hours per day one works, the more one earns, in line with intuition and
the model. Perhaps quite surprisingly, though, the estimated elasticity is very low:
on average, a 1% increase in hours worked is supposed to increase earnings by a mere
0,091%. This stands in sharp contrast to our model where wages move one-to-one
15Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen (2006) have shown that the measured levels of bridging social capital
in Poland are among the very lowest in Europe.
16The square term in work experience, although negative (in line with our expectations), turned
out to be insignificant in the regression so it was removed.
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with hours worked; the reason for this counterfactual prediction of our simple model is
that it ignores other production factors than labor, such as e.g. capital or technology,
which are clearly important for production in the real world.
The equation explaining log earnings has been estimated using OLS. We believe
that simple OLS estimates have the smallest variance among all linear estimates
here because a series of subsequent diagnostic tests has shown that the problems of
heteroskedasticity or endogeneity are negligible in the current case. All regressions
have been run using gretl.
Table 6: Estimating log earnings by OLS; n = 1570.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
Constant 5,34859 0,144595 36,9902 0,0000
Log friends 0,0407652 0,0211520 1,9273 0,0541
Log family −0,00340276 0,0222018 −0,1533 0,8782
Log hours worked 0,0913715 0,0242160 3,7732 0,0002
Size of towna −0,0929960 0,00888719 −10,4641 0,0000
Educationb 0,0607568 0,00513269 11,8372 0,0000
Experiencec 0,00329763 0,00162928 2,0240 0,0431
Age (in years) 0,00590911 0,00167971 3,5179 0,0004
a: size classes in descending order: 1 = city 500,000 +; 2 = city 200,000–500,000; ...;
6 = countryside. b: years of schooling. c: years of work at the current workplace.
Table 7: Basic diagnostics.
Dependent variable mean 6,38530
Dependent variable standard deviation 0,642662
Residual sum of squares 516,010
Residual standard error (σˆ) 0,574763
Coefficient of determination R2 0,203712
Adjusted R¯2 0,200143
F (7, 1562) 57,0858
Akaike information criterion 2724,52
Schwarz Bayesian criterion 2767,39
Hannan-Quinn criterion 2740,46
Model diagnostics summarized in Table 7 indicate that the model, though sig-
nificant and meaningful, leaves 80% of the variance of log earnings unexplained
(R¯2 = 0, 2). This disappointing fact is not too surprising given that our calcula-
tions are based on survey data (which introduces additional error) and that they
neglect technological and capital-related aspects of the workplace.
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5.2 Explaining SWB
The second step is to explain subjective well-being of the individuals using their levels
of bridging and bonding social capital as well as their earnings (which are endogenous
to the regression model) and a number of additional control variables (lumped into H
in equation (29)). The estimation has been done using 2SLS so that endogenous log
earnings have been instrumented by theoretical values from an auxilliary model ex-
plaining log earnings.17 This is sufficient to handle the problem of simultaneity. One
additional estimation problem prevailing here is related to heteroskedasticity. Re-
ported standard errors and t-statistics have thus been adjusted for heteroskedasticity
using the HC1 method.
As we see in Table 8, bridging social capital pulls double duty here: (i) it helps
increase earnings, and (ii) it provides additional increases to SWB beside those ob-
tained via increased earnings. An 1% increase in earnings brings about a 0,128%
increase in reported SWB. A 1% increase in bridging social capital in turn brings
about a 0,018% direct increase in SWB plus an 0, 041 · 0, 128% ≈ 0, 005% indirect
increase via earnings.
Table 8: Estimating log SWB by 2SLS (endogenous log earnings instrumented by
theoretical values from an auxilliary model), using standard errors robust to het-
eroskedasticity (HC1); n = 1306.
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
Constant 1,07451 0,186870 5,7501 0,0000
Log friends 0,0179255 0,00670589 2,6731 0,0075
Log family 0,00420792 0,00654698 0,6427 0,5204
Size of towna 0,0130551 0,00309540 4,2176 0,0000
Age (in years) −0,00200476 0,000436224 −4,5957 0,0000
Sex (1=Female) −0,0326582 0,00847854 −3,8519 0,0001
Sick (1=Yes) −0,0843580 0,0158093 −5,3360 0,0000
Housewifeb 0,0535437 0,0279824 1,9135 0,0557
Log household size 0,0755261 0,0222778 3,3902 0,0007
Log earnings 0,128854 0,0254309 5,0668 0,0000
a: size classes in descending order: 1 = city 500,000 +; 2 = city 200,000–500,000; ...;
6 = countryside. b: 0 = no, 1 = yes.
Bonding social capital, proxied by the number of frequently contacted members
of the family, turns out to be insignificant in the regression. The interpretation of
this result goes back to Proposition 3 which says that the relationship between the
17The auxilliary model was a slight generalization of the model described in the previous subsec-
tion. The difference is that we added a couple of insignificant exogenous variables to the regression.
Thanks to this step, R¯2 was raised from 0,2 to 0,34.
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amount of time invested in forming bonding social capital and SWB should be inverse
U-shaped. In the steady state, individuals would allocate less time than is required
to maximize instantaneous SWB, making us expect a positive relationship between
SWB and bonding social capital to be found in the data. The null relationship which
we find here means that in Poland, as opposed to the theoretical model, the level of
investment in bonding social capital is in fact (approximately) optimal. This means
that Poland is right on the summit of the inverse U-curve and additional investment
in bonding social capital would only lower SWB instead of increasing it.18
It must be noted that hours worked turned out to be insignificant in the regression.
This means that there is no direct impact of the amount of leisure time on SWB: all
impact is realized through (i) earnings, and (ii) the measures of social capital.
All the control variables have expected signs, confirming several interesting find-
ings of sociology (Wilson, 1967; Rose, 2000; Diener and Seligman, 2002; Helliwell,
2003):
• people living in smaller towns and villages enjoy higher levels of well-being than
those living in big cities (controlling for earnings which are greater in cities),
• on average, younger people are more satisfied with their lives,
• men are more satisfied with their lives than women,
• having suffered from a serious illness provides a strong drag on SWB.
Two further results are easily interpretable but slightly more problematic:
• “housewives” (i.e. people taking care of the household) are more satisfied with
their lives than other respondents,
• people are the more satisfied with their lives the greater is the household they
are living in.
As can be seen in Table 9, the model explains only a small fraction (around
8,5–9%) of the total variation of reported SWB. Given our estimation technique, it
is robust, however, to heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems. The invoked
Hausman test confirms that OLS estimates of this model would be inconsistent and
that using 2SLS is necessary.
In sum, our empirical results confirm all the principal cross-sectional predictions
of our theoretical model. They also shed some light on the current state of the Polish
society. Extremely low levels of bridging social capital found here, already reported
elsewhere (Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen, 2006), imply that increasing it would bring
unambiguously positive effects both in terms of average earnings and SWB. On the
other hand, high levels of bonding social capital (cf. Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi, 2004)
18Cook, Rice, and Gerbasi (2004) argue that social ties with kin are dominant in the Polish society.
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Table 9: Model diagnostics.
Dependent variable mean 2,11239
Dependent variable standard deviation 0,146650
Residual sum of squares 27,3056
Residual standard error (σˆ) 0,145152
Coefficient of determination R2 0,091643
Adjusted R¯2 0,085335
F (9, 1296) 14,5280
Akaike information criterion −1324,8
Schwartz Bayesian criterion −1273,1
Hannan-Quinn criterion −1305,4
Hausman test –
Null hypothesis: OLS estimator is consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: χ21 = 1144,87
p-value = 5,83288·10−251
First-stage F (1, 2007) = 112,839
indicate that increasing it further cannot bring about any positive results, neither for
earnings nor for SWB. It is possible that Poles “overinvest” in bonding social capital
and it is sure that Poles underinvest in bridging social capital.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the dependence between social capital – and in par-
ticular, its two dimensions: bridging and bonding social capital – and such measures
of individual success as earnings and subjective well-being (SWB).
The first step was to build a theoretical model describing the dynamics of social
capital formation. Individuals are assumed to invest their time in forming social ties
with family and friends because this (i) provides direct increases in well-being, and (ii)
can potentially help in obtaining a better job, and thus (indirectly) in increasing the
level of consumption. We have shown that people who have very few friends initially,
would at first invest a lot of time in finding them and in maintaining these contacts,
and then will their effort gradually decrease, such that in the long run, they would
spend less time on socializing than in the beginning. Conversely, for those endowed
with a lot of friends at the outset, the share of time spent on socializing will start off
very low and then gradually increase over time (see Figure 1).
The second step is to derive testable steady-state predictions from the model. The
theory suggests that there should be an unambiguously negative impact of bonding
social capital on earnings (due to the opportunity cost of working), and an inverse
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U-shaped relationship between bridging social capital and earnings: on the one hand,
bridging social capital increases efficiency, but on the other hand, it incurs an oppor-
tunity cost of foregone working time. Whether the steady state of the model is in the
increasing or in the decreasing part of this inverse U-shaped curve, depends on the
relative strength of these two counteracting effects.
As far as SWB is concerned, we find inverse U-shaped relationships both in the
case of bridging and of bonding social capital. The model, featuring discounted
utility-maximizing individuals, predicts the steady state to be in the increasing parts
of both inverse U-shaped curves.
The third step is to confront these predictions with real-world data. Using a cross-
section survey data set from the Polish “Social Diagnosis” program (2005 edition), we
show that (i) bridging social capital in positively related to earnings in Poland (since
the levels of bridging social capital are very low here, Poland is in the increasing part
of the inverse U-shaped curve), (ii) the negative impact of bonding social capital on
earnings is negligible, (iii) bridging social capital unambiguously increases SWB also
when controlling for (endogenously determined) earnings, (iv) bonding social capital
turns out to be unrelated to SWB (indicating that Poland is in the maximum part
of this inverse U-shaped curve).
While computing these results, we have used a number of control variables and
carefully selected estimation techniques in order to obtain precise and consistent es-
timates. One natural extension of the current paper would be to test the predictions
of our theoretical model against different datasets and to compare the results across
countries.
The direct implication for Poland is that the worryingly low levels of bridging
social capital recorded here are a significant force which lowers not only the subjective
well-being of Poles, related to their happiness and satisfaction with life, but also their
individual earnings – which a directly measurable, down-to-earth characteristic. Any
steps aimed at increasing bridging social capital in Poland would result in increases
in private and social wealth, and indirectly also in social trust and the confidence in
democracy. It really pays to invest in bridging social capital in Poland.
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